Motivating Civil Servants for Reform and Performance by Paul, Elisabeth
 
 








































2 | G l o b a l  E v e n t  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  
 
Acknowledgments 
‘Capacity is Development' is a call to systematically review, capture and discuss key capacity 
development lessons of the past and to look on to the future. Through distilling key policy and 
investment choices made over time to motivate forward planning on capacity development, 
this research paper helped define the content framework of the ‘Capacity is Development' 
Global Event. This paper was written by Elisabeth Paul. Special mention is made of 
contributions by Matthew Cummins, Kirsten Ejlskov‐Jensen, Yvonne Helle, Jamshed Kazi, Hugh 










United Nations Development Programme 
304 East 45th Street 











DISCLAIMER: The findings, interpretations and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and 










3 | G l o b a l  E v e n t  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  
 






In any type of organization, implementing a change or reform often suffers a dismal fate, 
notably because of resistance by change agents themselves (Gilley et al., 2009). This is 
especially the case in developing countries, where lessons from several decades of governance 
and public sector reforms show that high degree of failure may often be explained by their 
focus on technology enhancement and reform content – without paying sufficient attention to 
the approach of changing behavior and organizational culture, including individual incentives 
for reform (e.g. Schacter, 2000; Easterly, 2001; Polidano, 2001; IEG, 2008a). Public sector 
reforms can be motivated by a series of reasons such as popular pressure, fiscal crisis, and 
financial support (IEG 2008a: 69‐70). However, reforms which are potentially beneficial for the 
nation as a whole are almost certain to produce losers as well as winners (Klitgaard, 1997); they 
are therefore likely to give rise to resistance by potential losers. Besides, implementing reforms 
call for an extra amount of effort and cooperation, and a reform has little chance of being 
successfully sustained if those who manage it do not have appropriate incentives at crucial 
stages of implementation (Drazen, 2000). Beyond their role in sustaining reforms, civil servants’ 
motivation and incentives are now consistently acknowledged as critical factors in determining 
performance in the public sector, and enabling capacity building1 (Wai, 1995; IEG, 2008b; 
UNDP, 2006, 2009). This is true not only for those civil servants in charge of managing reforms, 
but also for street‐level bureaucrats and front‐line workers who implement public policies. 
Indeed, the latter may actually also be involved, to some extent, in policy‐making, because they 
interpret and transform policy handed down from the top; understanding the motivations and 
incentives of this level of the civil service is thus also vitally important. 
 
However, correct incentives are often lacking in the public sector in low income countries. In 
particular, the rapid expansion of employment of the civil service in many of them in the 1970s‐
1980s has been facilitated by reducing salaries, especially those at management level. 
Overstaffing and low salaries thus resulted on adverse consequences, including poor staff 
morale and a decline in work effort; difficulties in recruiting and retaining technical and 
professional staff; nontransparent forms of remuneration, especially nonwage benefits in cash 
                                                 
1 For instance, IEG (2008b) points that inadequate resources and incentives impair implementation of learning 
following training courses, especially for civil servants. All in all, training can help build capacity only insofar it is 
accompanied by strategies to deal with problems of staff turnover and weak incentives. 
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or in kind; and strong incentives to accept bribes (Lienert, 1998). The present paper aims to 
provide some informed reflections on how to motivate civil servants for performance and 
reform, especially in the perspective of sustaining capacity development.2 Several types of 
public sector reforms have typically turned to be analyzed under the perspective of motivation 
and incentives to explain their lack of success, as shown hereunder. 
 
1.1 Civil service and administration reforms 
 
While civil service and administration reforms have been essential for sustaining public sector 
reforms in other areas, they tend to be less successful than other reforms such as those relating 
to public expenditure and fiscal administration (IEG, 2008a). Civil services in many developing 
countries “are frequently too large, too expensive, and insufficiently productive; and civil 
servants, especially those in managerial positions, get few incentives and are poorly motivated” 
(Nunberg, 1994: 120; quoted in Klitgaard, 1997: 490). Many low income countries have taken 
important steps in “first‐generation” reforms – i.e. based on restructuring and downsizing civil 
services. Yet, beyond a certain point, cutting costs by squeezing real wages becomes 
counterproductive as skilled staff members leave the civil service; those who remain become 
demoralized; and absenteeism, moonlighting, and corruption increase (Lienert, 1998). 
Overemphasis on cost‐containment as an end in itself has by the way given civil service reform 
a bad name, maximizing resistance to reforms and ultimately nullifying the very savings from 
cost‐containment itself (Schiavo‐Campo, 1998). To address these problems, countries have 
been attempting to lead “second‐generation” reforms aimed at revamping pay and promotion 
policies (Lienert, 1998), as presented in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Two generations of civil service reforms in developing countries 
 
 Main objectives Typical reforms
“First‐generation” CS 
reforms 
Quantitative containment of 
the wage bill, aimed at 
macroeconomic stabilization 
(focus on policies) 
- Downsizing the civil service 
- Redeployment of staff to priority sectors 
- Elimination of ghost workers 
- Salary freezes 
- Subcontracting to the private sector 
“Second‐generation” 
CS reforms 
Qualitative reforms aimed at 
improving the quality of civil 
service (focus on institutions) 
- Restructuring remuneration so as to narrow 
differentials with the private sector (notably 
through wage decompression) 
                                                 
2 UNDP defines capacity development as the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, 
strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time. 
Motivation refers to the initiation, direction, intensity and persistence of behavior. Incentives, on the other hand, 
are external measures that are designed and established to influence motivation and behavior of individuals, 
groups or organizations; incentive systems or structures are combinations of several more or less coherent 
incentives. Motivators include purposive incentives in the above sense but also all other external factors, which 
impact upon peoples or organizations motivation (UNDP, 2006, 2009). 
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- Changing promotion and personnel 
management policies so that merit and 
initiative are rewarded 
- Reassessing the mix of wage and nonwage 
spending, particularly in priority sectors 
- Providing training to upgrade skills 
- Improving civil service management 
Source: Lienert and Modi (1997), Lienert (1998) 
 
Yet, the multiple objectives of first‐ and second‐generation reforms can give rise to conflicts, 
and little progress has been reached in second generation reforms (Lienert, 1998).3 
 
1.2 Public finance management 
 
A second important field where reforms have consistently failed because of their lack of 
attention to individual incentives is public finance management (PFM). Practitioners have 
recently attempted to better understand the institutional context of budget practices in low 
income countries. In that vein, Stevens (2004) attributes the stability of dysfunctional PFM 
practices in these countries to the fact that stakeholders have adjusted to poorly performing 
systems, and the resulting informality may be more consistent than the formal rules with the 
country’s actual governance reality. Indeed, the performance of PFM systems cannot be viewed 
in isolation of the human resources situation in governments, particularly the condition of the 
civil service, the loss of skills, the inadequate pay received by professionals and managers, and 
the imperative this creates to develop alternative sources of income. To quote Stevens (2004: 
2‐3), “[h]ow budget and financial management systems are actually operated depends on the 
interaction between formal and informal rules – the institutional and individual incentive 
systems that stakeholders respond to. […] The informal rules are rational responses to the 
incentives with which budget actors are faced. These incentives arise partly from local 
circumstances, such as the collapse of conventional incentive systems, most egregiously civil 
service pay and conditions, the demands of ministers, and the decay of accountability.” 
Powerful incentives are also created by the political and the aid processes, because donors 
have become a major influence on the institutional and individual incentives that stakeholders 
respond to. Stevens (2004) provides numerous examples of how local incentives affect the 
                                                 
3 For example, in Uganda, Robinson (2006: 20) notes that “[f]ailure to make progress on pay reform for the vast 
majority of public servants contributes to declining motivation. Large differentials between administrative grades 
and top civil servants, along with special treatment for senior officials in the political bureaucracy and semi‐
autonomous bodies […] fuel resentment, undermine morale and provide a stimulus to corruption. The lack of 
incentives for public servants who have to cope with continuous reform initiatives and future uncertainty further 
runs counter to a key objective of the reform programme.” 
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functioning of PFM systems.4 All in all, countries may be unable to implement PFM reforms, for 




Another significant reform that is recurrent, especially in Africa, is the progressive 
decentralization of the State – that is, the transfer of public authority, resources, and personnel 
from the national level to sub‐national jurisdictions. A recent study on three defining aspects of 
decentralization – political, administrative, and fiscal – indicates a moderate degree of 
decentralization in the Africa region. Political decentralization is the most advanced, but fiscal 
decentralization lags behind; decentralization is particularly weak for Francophone and 
Lusophone countries (World Bank, 2003). The literature on decentralization often neglects the 
political underpinning of the process; yet, decentralizing technical processes such as 
procurement is actually highly political as it means decentralizing significant authority (Stevens, 
2004). In particular, despite the key role of the central bureaucracy in designing and 
implementing decentralization processes, its incentives to do so are mixed. The incentives of 
political elites and bureaucrats have indeed been identified as powerful factors explaining why 
decentralization is more advanced in some countries than in others (Ndegwa and Levy, 2004). 
 
1.4 Anti‐corruption measures 
 
The fight against corruption has also been much studied from the perspective of individual 
incentives. If it is not addressed directly, corruption may undermine capacity building and 
institutional development projects (Klitgaard, 1997). A variety of factors contribute to 
corruption, such as the complexity of laws and procedures, the monopoly power and degree of 
discretion of officials, the lack of adequate monitoring and supervision, the commitment of 
political leadership, and the overall environment in the public sector (Purohit, 2007: 286). The 
low level of public sector wages in developing countries is often advanced as a leading factor 
affecting corruption; however, the empirical evidence as to whether low civil service wages 
foster corruption is mixed.5 Nevertheless, the fight against corruption gains in understanding 
                                                 
4 To name a few: fiscal sustainability is jeopardized in heavily aided countries by the powerful incentive for 
departments to multiply projects to capture more donor resources; sector ministry officials have an incentive to 
create extra budgetary funds if government pay scales are deficient, and separate fund status may be parlayed 
into salary enhancements; dual budgeting is particularly encouraged because running costs incorporated into 
donor funded capital projects come with the expectation of “perks” such as overseas travel, donor allowances and 
training; cash budgeting creates rents for those who control the process and enhances their power, notably 
because bribes paid by contractors to ensure release of funds for major projects may be shared between the line 
ministry and ministry of finance officials; etc. 
5 Some evidence suggests that, following the so‐called “efficiency wage hypothesis”, rent seeking is reduced when 
firms pay higher wages (e.g., Cappelli and Chauvin, 1991; Goldsmith et al., 2000). Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2001) find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between relative civil‐service pay and corruption. Di 
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the reasons why individuals are tempted by misusing office for unofficial ends. This differs 
according to local settings, so that the relevance of anticorruption programs varies according to 
given country circumstances (Shah, 2007).6 Note also that anti‐corruption commissions are as 
likely to be affected by the same problems as any other public sector institution (Doig et al., 
2007), so that the multiplication of institutions responsible for ensuring probity and integrity in 
the public service – as reported in Uganda by Robinson (2006), for instance – without providing 




Table 2 below synthesizes a number of private incentives that may interfere with the general 
goals of public service reforms in developing countries. 
 
Table 2: Examples of private incentives possibly interfering with public service reforms 
 
Types of reform Stakeholders Counter‐productive incentives
Civil Service Reforms Politicians - Willing to increase the number of civil servants for 
patronage reasons 
- Unwilling to base recruitment and promotion on merit, 
prefer nepotism 
 Workers - Weakly motivated and unwilling to put forth effort 





Treasury - Willing to extract rents by abusing of its dominant 
position in deciding which expenses will be paid first 
 Line Ministries and 
Agencies 
- Willing to negotiate with donors on a bilateral basis 
- Willing to use special procedures to fasten and ease fund 
management 
- Willing to have separate bank accounts to increase 
management flexibility 
- Weak incentives for internal audit 
 Politicians / 
Parliament 
- Prefer capital projects for political and rent‐extraction 
reasons 
- May collude with corrupt administration if they need cash 
to finance the electoral process 
- Weak capacities for scrutinizing the budget 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tella and Schargodsky (2002) argue that when control mechanisms are weak, wages do not have any impact on 
corruption. Other authors, such as Rauch and Evans (2000), find no relationship between wages and corruption. 
6 For example, Shah (2007: 247) points that increasing public sector wages may have negligible to weak impact on 
corruption according to the general state of governance in the country; generally speaking, it is likely to have little 
impact on grand corruption, but possibly a positive impact on petty corruption. For its part, merit‐based civil 
service may have low to high impact on corruption – but it can be derailed by bureaucratic processes in highly 
corrupt societies. 
7 Main source for this subsection: Stevens (2004). 
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 Workers - Weakly motivated and trained
- Have developed informal rules that are more in line with 
real constraints ? resist change 
 External auditors - Weak capacities and motivation
- Weak follow‐up and sanction power 
 Donors - Willing to secure priority funding (earmarking) and 
sometimes, to provide special treatments for staff 
working for their projects 
- Sometimes preferring to negotiate with sectoral 
ministries 
Decentralization Central authorities - Unwilling to transfer resources (power) 
 Decentralized 
bodies 
- Often deprived of sufficient capacities 
- Capable staff prefer working in large cities 
- Female staff obliged to follow their husband 
Anti‐corruption 
measures 




- Subject to similar environment/problems as other public 
bodies 
- Sometimes used by the government to harm political 
opponents 
 Societies - Often tolerant vis‐à‐vis corruption (considered as “gift”)
Source: Compilation by the author 
 
As illustrated by the examples above, incentives are a critical factor for the success of reforms 
and the performance of public organizations. After a general overview of the major lessons 
from the literature on incentives, the rest of the paper identifies major incentive issues that 
should be taken into account in designing appropriate institutions facilitating reform processes 
and capacity development in developing countries. 
 
2. Lessons from the Literature on Incentive Theory8 
 
The mainstream economic literature on incentives – especially institutional economics9 and 
more precisely, the principal‐agent theory – may be very helpful for designing appropriate 
incentives for public reform.10 Indeed, the employment relationship may be viewed as one in 
which a “principal” (employer) delegates work to one or several “agents” (workers), whose 
effort or activity yields results for the principal. The latter will in turn provide them with 
appropriate incentives – both “carrots” (such as premiums) and “sticks” (penalties). Agent 
remuneration may, in principle, be based on inputs (e.g. effort, time spent at office) or on 
output (results). Remuneration is called “high‐powered” the more strongly and directly it is 
linked to worker results – which may be a good option when effort is not easy to measure, and 
                                                 
8 This section is based on an extensive literature survey performed by Paul and Robinson (2007). 
9 Institutional economics considers that institutions (i.e. the formal and informal rules of the game in a society) 
structure incentives in human exchange, and ultimately determine performance (North, 1990). 
10 See for example Leruth and Paul (2007) for PFM, and Azfar (2007) for corruption. 
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supervision is costly and/or imprecise. However, the literature points to major problems 
limiting the scope for paying workers on the basis of their output, especially performance 
measurement problems leading to effort distortions11 (e.g. maximizing quantity of medical 
acts/pupils, at the expense of the quality of healthcare/schooling) and/or manipulating data to 
game the system. Moreover, it may be difficult to distinguish the contribution of one worker 
from others (e.g. when outputs are produced by a team, as well as for managers); workers may 
be induced into acting non‐cooperatively if they compete for promotions or incentives; and 
high powered incentives transfer risks to workers in case of uncertainty due to uncontrollable 
external factors. The conclusion of this literature is that the less measurable are worker results, 
and the greater the uncertainty about the relationship between worker effort and the results 
measures available, the less use should be made of high‐powered incentives. As for empirical 
evidence, it shows that financial incentives are associated with higher quantity of worker 
output (Gupta and Shaw, 1998; Jenkins et al., 1998; Prendergast, 1999); however, this evidence 
relates almost exclusively to jobs with routine tasks or at corporate managers’ compensation, 
and says little about other jobs where measurement is difficult. The available literature on 
impacts on performance quality is inconclusive (Gupta and Shaw, 1998). There is also limited 
evidence of dysfunctional responses – perverse effects and gaming – to pay‐for‐performance 
systems based on “distortionary” performance measures (Baker et al., 1994; Prendergast, 
1999). 
 
Quite obviously, the optimal remuneration scheme will depend on the context and nature of 
the tasks performed. A set of factors have been identified as determining the appropriateness 
of employment and remuneration regimes, such as the ease and cost of monitoring, the 
availability, cost and quality of performance measures, and the importance of workgroup 
cooperation. The problems affecting the use of high‐powered incentives tend to be severe in 
the public sector where performance measurement is particularly difficult because of the 
multiplicity of missions, and because worker cooperation in some sectors is so important that 
excessive wage differentials could be damaging to team cooperation. Therefore, financial 
performance incentives may optimally be absent or very low‐powered in the public sector 
(Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Tirole, 1994; Dixit, 2002), and public agencies rather resort 
preponderantly on other types of incentives to promote better performance, such as 
promotion, deferred compensation (e.g. seniority pay and pensions), supervision, task 
assignment and work organization. 
 
The key deficiency of the mainstream economic literature is its adherence to the postulate that 
workers are strictly materialistically self‐interested. There is, however, considerable evidence 
                                                 
11 If workers are self‐interested (as postulated in the mainstream economic literature) and faced with high‐
powered incentives linked to imperfect output measures, they are likely to ruthlessly focus effort on what is 
measured, neglecting what is not measured and which does not enter into their compensation scheme. This will be 
a problem in any “multi‐tasking” context – that is, when the work to be performed encompasses several 
dimensions, some of which are less measurable than others (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). 
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indicating that people often act contrary to their material self‐interest, and that informal norms 
and socio‐psychological forces may often motivate workers more powerfully than financial 
incentives do (Baron, 1988). Non‐monetary motivations have been studied for decades by 
social scientists and psychologists (e.g. Herzberg, 1968; Deci, 1971; Lepper and Greene, 1978) 
and their findings are now more and more used by economists. As a range of different concepts 
have emerged, Paul and Robinson (2007) propose to distinguish between “materialistic” self‐
interested motivations and “non‐materialistic” motivations; and within the latter category, 
between social, intrinsic and moral motivations. Non‐materialistic motivation is particularly 
strong in the public sector, and so‐called “public service motivation” may be defined as an 
altruistic motivation to serve the interests of the community, which leads public sector 
employees to commit effort because of the value they attach to a social service or other public 
goal (François, 2000). The mobilization of non‐materialistic motivations requires different types 
of motivators than financial ones, such as social pressure; task enrichment, empowerment, and 
participation; good leadership; and other aspects of the quality of the working environment.12 
In particular, the sense of fairness has been identified as one crucial element of social 
motivation and it has been shown that workers who believe they are being fairly treated are 
more likely to put forth effort and commitment, while workers who feel unfairly treated may 
quit, reduce their effort level, steal from the employer, or even sabotage output (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 1997). Note also that under specific circumstances, the increased activation of 
materialistic motivation by monetary rewards might reduce (“crowd out”) individuals’ non‐
materialistic motivation. 
 
Finally, in multi‐task settings – which concern most public sector jobs – it is often helpful to use 
multiple instruments to provide a balanced, coherent package of incentives (Gibbons, 1998; 
Holmström and Milgrom, 1994). The choice of an appropriate motivational system should be 
done using the logic of a cost‐effectiveness analysis; that is, by comparing the incremental 
benefit prompted by the proposed instruments with all their costs, including potential perverse 
effects resulting from the imperfection of individual performance measures and potential 
negative effect of individual incentives on cooperation (Paul and Robinson, 2007). 
 
Following this general overview of the general literature on incentives and motivators, the next 
two sections identify interesting practices for motivating civil servants for performance and 
reform. Note that while motivation lies within individuals, incentives and motivators may 
pertain to – or be designed at – different levels: individual, organizational or contextual. The 
next two sections deal with the effects upon civil servants’ individual motivation of the general 
incentive system which is often shaped by factors which combine and interact, and which 
pertain to these three levels; thus the level is not specified every time. 
 
                                                 
12 Note that motivators may be positive and/or negative: some external actions and conditions – such as perceived 
unfair treatment and bad working conditions – may actually reduce worker motivation. 
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Before moving on, let us notice that the bulk of the literature on incentives has been written 
upon the context of developed, Western countries. However, individuals from different cultural 
backgrounds are likely to be more sensitive to some types of motivations and to react 
somewhat differently to external interventions (Hofstede, 2001). In addition to different social 
norms, the public service in low‐income countries faces a series of characteristics and 
constraints that may impede the use or reduce the power of some kinds of motivators that 
have proved effective in other settings. Such constraints might for instance be: 
 
- the lack and/or poor quality of performance information; 
- very low wages that may result in civil servants feeling to be unfairly treated – thus 
decreasing their loyalty to the organization, which may justify “sabotage” behaviors; 
- weak institutionalized public service motivation resulting from a devalorization of civil 
service following structural adjustment programs (e.g. Bergamaschi et al., 2008), together 
with an implicit social acceptance of absenteeism and corruption; 
- demotivating factors such as bad working conditions and little merit recognition, that may 
hamper intrinsic motivation; 
- inadequate judicial systems making it harder to punish deviant behavior. 
 
In the face of these additional pervasive problems, the question of how to motivate agents to 
perform is even more difficult in developing countries. 
 
3. Motivating Civil Servants through Financial Incentives 
 
Even if it is only part of the picture, materialistic motivation is an important one. The argument 
that adequate pay is crucial for sustaining the motivation, performance, and integrity of public 
servants has been widely accepted and documented (Kiragu et al. 2004: 109). However, in 
many developing countries, civil servants receive weak base salaries and hence are poorly 
financially motivated. Even if estimating total wages is difficult because of the variety of 
rewards received in addition to base salary (e.g. allowances, job security, in‐kind rewards), 
many developing countries’ civil services have experienced a fall in real wages since the 
decades of adjustment (Klitgaard, 1997; Lienert, 1998; Schiavo‐Campo, 1998). For example, a 
study found that in 1985 the base civil service salary rate at the “highest grade” was 4 per cent 
of what it was in 1975 in Somalia, 16 per cent in Sierra Leone, 19 per cent in Tanzania, and 22 
per cent in Nigeria (Robinson, 1990; quoted in Klitgaard, 1997). More recent data on Africa 
indicate a steady deterioration in public service pay in some francophone countries during the 
1990s, combined with a consistently egalitarian character of the pay system in these countries, 
as indicated by a comparatively low salary decompression ratio – that is, the ratio between top 
and lowest salaries. This is an important attribute of a pay structure, a low ratio indicating a 
commitment to an egalitarian pay structure, one that minimizes the pay differential between 
the higher and lower echelons of the public service. Top salary levels in countries with low 
decompression ratios (such as in Senegal, where it fell from 3.8 in 1992 to 3.0 in 2000) are too 
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low to keep professionals in the public service (Kiragu et al., 2004). The so‐called Washington 
model of employment reform advocates the reduction of the number of civil servants in order 
to increase the wages of those who survive, and particularly of senior and specialist staff 
(McCourt, 2000). Salary decompression has been included in initial reforms in countries such as 
Ethiopia and Mozambique, which had previously socialist “wage equalization” policies (Lienert, 
1998). Yet, in countries such as Ghana and Zambia, real salaries generally continued to drop 
through the 1990s despite recurring, almost annual, nominally large salary increases that the 
strong trade unions achieved by persistently pressuring the governments (Kiragu et al., 2004). 
Note also that civil servants are generally paid less than their private sector equivalents; 
however, the public‐private sector wage differential varies greatly between countries (Lienert, 
1998; Schiavo‐Campo, 1998). 
 
As pointed by Klitgaard (1997: 494), “[u]nder such conditions, it is not surprising that so many 
capacity building projects discover that as soon as public servants are trained to higher skill 
levels, they depart to the private sector. Nor is it surprising that key technical posts go unfilled. 
With such poor incentives, many projects report underperformance due to an inability to get 
and motivate competent local staff.” Insufficient salaries and related demotivation are also 
often argued to partly explain deviant or predatory behavior, weak performance, resistance to 
reforms and various coping strategies on the part of civil servants (e.g. Van Lerberghe et al., 
2002). This probably relates to the issue of fairness we have briefly presented in Section 2: as 
long as civil servants believe they are unfairly treated, one should expect to witness 
dysfunctional behaviors on their part, such as absenteeism and corruption. 
 
The public sector pay bill is a strategic variable in most countries’ macro‐economic policies 
(Marsden, 1993). Part of the explanation for the fall in civil servants’ real wages lies in the 
ceiling on total wage bills imposed by international financial institutions or regional agreements 
(e.g. convergence criteria in the West African Economic and Monetary Union), combined with a 
tendency of governments to expand public employment for (low grade) civil servants for 
patronage purpose. If the principle of setting a limit on the wage bill is justified, it is more and 
more argued that such ceilings are excessively low and should be relaxed in order to enable 
paying more and better public service providers, as explained in the box below. 
 
Box 1: Wage bill caps and the case for teachers 
 
Some developing countries are subject to budgetary restrictions on the total wage bill, sometimes 
imposed as conditionality by international financial institutions. Based on such an overall constraint, the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) may set specific “caps” on the number of teachers that can be hired. 
However, the criteria used in setting the ceilings often remain unclear and rarely rest on an assessment 
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A study on wages in Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone shows that the wage bill ceiling have not 
been designed for increasing staffing and pay in priority sectors such as education, and their main 
impact has been to prevent or slow the recruitment of new workers. While it is in the best position to 
determine how many teachers are needed, in none of the three case studies was the Ministry of 
Education directly involved in setting the wage bill ceiling; rather it was simply told, after the decision 
had been taken, how many new teachers could be hired. Consequently, wage bill ceilings are too low to 
allow the government to hire the teachers needed to achieve the pupil‐teacher ratio of 40:1 
recommended by international standards; there is considerable evidence that the current ceilings 
compromise the quality of education in each of these countries (ActionAid, 2007). 
 
 
Wage bill ceilings are far from being the only problem prevailing in the pay structure in most 
countries, which also suffer from opaque remuneration systems; unclear link between pay and 
responsibilities, as well as between pay and performance; and insufficient pay to retain 
employees with scarce skills (McCourt, 2000). All in all, in many countries, there is an urgent 
need to increase remuneration – most of all for professional, technical and managerial 
positions (Lienert, 1998) – and to generally better design incentives for civil servants, be it on an 
individual or collective (organizational) level. There is no blueprint solution to do so, and 
various options are discussed below. 
 
3.1 Comprehensive pay reforms 
 
The scope, scale, and organization of public sectors vary greatly among countries around the 
world, and so do the pay and job classification systems, as well as the mechanisms for setting 
pay. Key themes emerging in pay policy reforms in OECD countries include attempts to 
introduce a greater degree of sensitivity to local labor market conditions, to adapt pay systems 
to new management methods, and to alter the basis of motivation in pay by means of 
performance‐related pay (Marsden, 1993). Many developing countries have also tried to 
undertake global civil service pay reforms. Kiragu et al. (2004) examines the tactics, techniques, 
sequencing, and politics of pay policy in eight African countries, and reckon that public service 
pay is a complex and extremely political issue. It is intertwined with the politics of resource 
mobilization and (re)allocation, and it involves many institutional actors whose nature, role, 
and strength deserve attention. In particular, the donor community and the trade unions of 
workers have been identified by that study as major forces supporting (or blocking) pay 
reforms. As for the design and implementation strategies of pay reforms, a plethora of tactics 
and techniques have been observed, which Kiragu et al. (2004) have linked to models of pay 
decision‐making as shown in Table 3 below.13 
                                                 
13 Note that the emergence of technically rational models of pay reform in the study countries is relatively recent; 
however, this school has a narrow perspective of public service issues and tends to oversimplify the consequences 
of the decisions made, especially in terms of how they are experienced or perceived by various interest groups. 
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Table 3: Three major categories of models, policy orientations, and decision‐making models 
 
Model category Main policy concerns Pay decision making models 
Technically rational 
 
- Productivity of the workers
- Ability to recruit, retain, and motivate 
skilled workers 
- Fairness of the compensation system 
- Transparency of pay structure 
- Affordability of the wage bill 
1. Performance‐based 
2. Market‐benchmarking 
3. Job evaluation and re‐grading 





- As above but moderated by political 
considerations 
- In some countries, egalitarianism 
5. Corporation
6. Salary indexation 




- None that is conscious or coherent
- In some countries, regime survival 
8. Pressure‐driven patronage 
 
Source: Kiragu et al. (2004: 121) 
 
3.2 Differentiated wages for categories of workers 
 
Reforming public pay systems in order to better adjust to the market and provide right 
incentives poses difficult problems because of the existence of a large number of employees on 
strongly inter‐linked rates (Marsden, 1993).14 While a global, across‐the‐board pay rise may be 
desirable to reach a sense of fairness on the part of civil servants, comprehensive pay reforms 
may be costly and difficult to implement in the first place, so that alternative measures may be 
taken in the short run. A possibility is to differentiate wages by targeting certain categories of 
personnel. For instance, in the 1990’s in Burkina Faso and Senegal, real salaries declined for all 
groups, but governments increasingly used allowances and in‐kind benefits to raise pay for a 
few categories of workers such as teachers, health workers and magistrates. But these 
decisions seem to have been highly political: apparently the trade unions of these groups had 
pressured the government into this action; at the same time, the public service elite also 
awarded itself more allowances and in‐kind benefits, so that only those public servants in 
politically weak or disadvantaged categories bore the full brunt of the decline in real salaries 
(Kiragu et al., 2004: 111). 
 
When a comprehensive pay reform is too difficult to implement, another potential solution may 
be to delink salaries from civil service payroll, for instance by creating autonomous agencies 
                                                                                                                                                             
Yet, any country initiating pay reform needs to understand and appreciate the nature of the political system, its 
social structure, and the nature and strength of the power centers (Kiragu et al., 2004). 
14 The advantage of a single set of scales is presumably that it helps create a single identity for public service 
employees, and it facilitates deployment of staff between regions and between functions. It does, however, 
presuppose a somewhat homogeneous workforce and a high degree of stability over time in the skill content of 
different types of work (Marsden, 1993). 
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with management freedom and specific organizational incentives. However, this is often 
opposed by trade unions, fearing to lose extra advantages of civil service such as job security 
and retirement allowances. Some examples exist anyway, with mixed results, as shown below. 
 
Box 2: The Ugandan Revenue Authority 
 
The Ugandan Revenue Authority (URA) has been given semi‐autonomous status, which permitted 
donors to provide salary top‐ups. In 1993, URA salaries were reported to be between eight and nine 
times higher than in other public bodies, though staff lost other benefits available to civil servants; by 
2000, the salary gap with the civil service had reduced to a differential of four to five times on account 
of inflation. De‐linking the URA from civil service pay and the desire to recruit highly motivated 
professional senior managers were reflected in significant differentials between the top and bottom 
grades, with a compression ratio above 30. While creating strong incentives for senior managers, 
disparities on this scale were a probable cause of discontent at lower levels and resentment from 
officials from other bodies, as well as a factor in the subsequent growth of corruption in the 
organization. The initial impact of the creation of the URA on levels of tax collection was impressive; yet, 
despite early success, the URA has consistently failed to meet annual revenue targets (Robinson, 2006). 
 
 
A fairer and more effective way of providing financial incentives without de‐linking workers 
from civil service is to provide special premiums based on objective criteria, especially for 
motivating civil servants to work in remote and poor areas. Large and relatively under‐
populated low‐income countries encounter serious difficulties in ensuring the availability of 
public service providers – especially qualified ones – countrywide, because staff prefers being 
located in large cities. Therefore, allowing monetary premiums and other advantages for 
workers effectively posted in difficult areas may be a powerful incentive. This has been 
experimented with success in various Western African countries such as Mauritania, Senegal, 
Mali and Niger, which experience similar shortages of technical health staff outside capitals and 
large cities. After classifying difficult areas according to objective factors such as remoteness, 
isolation, poverty and security levels, special premiums have been introduced (often with 
support from one or several donors) in order to induce staff into working in these areas. Such 
systems are quite new but results so far are encouraging (e.g. Diop and Paul, 2007; Samaké et 
al., 2009; Workforce Alliance). 
 
3.3 Performance‐based incentives 
 
The low levels of salaries are only part of the story; incentives are also weak in the sense that 
often good performance is not rewarded and bad performance is not punished (Klitgaard, 1997: 
494). In order to motivate workers to perform better, some authors have recommended 
introducing “high‐powered” incentives in the public sector, in the form of pay‐for‐performance 
based on objective measures of performance (outputs or outcomes). However, this is not 
exempt from risks, and the debate over the appropriateness of pay‐for‐performance is raging. 
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Linking pay to objective performance measures may potentially improve workers’ revenues, 
motivation and results, especially in contexts where general wage increases are difficult to 
envisage, and improving public service delivery is a concern. Performance incentives may also 
have positive effects beyond the strict “mechanistic” effect on material motivation – that of 
clarifying goals and having workers being aware of the importance of performing (Robinson, 
2007). Besides, performance‐based pay schemes are likely to attract most performing workers. 
However, the introduction of performance‐based incentives deserves caution because of the 
informational and risk problems pointed in Section 2. Special features of developing countries 
may indeed reinforce the difficulty to find an appropriate measure of performance; as a 
byproduct, output measurement problems may exacerbate perverse behavioral responses such 
as distorting effort to easily measurable dimensions of performance (e.g. focusing on rewarded 
tasks at the expenses of others, privileging quantity over quality, neglecting maintenance of 
assets, etc.) and manipulating data to game the system. Besides, as high powered incentives 
transfer risks to workers in case of uncertainty due to uncontrollable external factors, providing 
a high portion of remuneration in the form of performance premiums may not be acceptable 
for workers – all the more since incentive schemes are generally ineffective in unstable 
situations. All in all, performance‐based schemes should obviously be designed in such a way as 
to balance increased performance with total cost (including costs of information, supervision, 
and performance premiums). However, to our knowledge, no performance‐based incentive 
scheme has been subject to such a cost‐effectiveness analysis. Moreover, as pay‐for‐
performance schemes have so far often been limited to experimentation and not generalized, 
using financial incentives may be prohibitively costly considering developing countries’ cash 
constraint.15 
 
Despite their risks and limitations, some experiences of high‐powered financial incentives in 
developing countries have been successful. For instance, the introduction of pay‐for‐
performance in tax collection authorities has been suggested as a way to increase workers’ 
motivation and hence performance, and to reduce rent‐seeking behavior. An assessment of a 
major incentive reform instituted in 1989 by the Brazilian tax collection authority finds that the 
growth in fines per inspection after the reform was about 75% above what it would have been 
without it; however, there was substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across tax 
regions (Kahn et al., 2001). Performance‐based payment is notably increasingly advocated as a 




Box 3: Performance‐based incentives in the health sector 
                                                 
15 In practice, the “variable” part of remuneration attributable to performance incentives is generally low. One may 
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Performance‐based payment in the health sector is generally introduced as an element of broader 
service contracting reforms. No unified model has still emerged, but evidence from low‐income 
countries such as Cambodia, Afghanistan and Haiti shows that performance‐based financing can 
improve health service delivery more successfully than traditional input financing mechanisms 
(Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005; USAID, 2007). 
 
A countrywide performance‐based pay initiative has been introduced by the Rwandan government since 
2001, and gradually implemented throughout the country since 2005. This initiative links measurable 
indicators with financial incentives for health workers who are paid according to their actual 
performance, rather than fixed bonuses. Positive changes have been achieved in the delivery of the 




Such schemes generally comprise both individual financial incentives and other incentives, such 
as enhanced training opportunities for staff and material grants for the facility. However, 
despite pay‐for‐performance is praised by some authors on the basis of a few experiments – 
and promoted by some donors in other parts of the world – consistent evidence on the 
(comparative) success of performance‐based incentives is lacking, especially with respect to 
potential perverse effects and cost‐effectiveness of incentive schemes. 
 
When objective measures of performance are not available or are too biased, one can also 
consider paying staff on the basis of a subjective performance assessment – that is, ratings by 
peers or supervisors that are intended to capture aspects of the workers’ contribution to the 
agency which are hard to measure. This is for instance the case in Singapore, where the civil 
service introduced in 1983 a Potential Appraisal System (borrowed from a private petroleum 
company) to appraise senior civil servants for promotion and development process (Vallance, 
1999). The use of bonuses based on performance appraisals (together with other incentives) is 
now more and more used in Singapore, as explained below. 
 
Box 4: Civil Service Pay in Singapore 
 
In Singapore, civil service salaries are commensurate with those offered by the private sector. Significant 
social prestige attaches to employment in the higher ranks of the civil service and senior staff is richly 
rewarded for its efforts, with civil service salaries being amongst the highest in the world. Perhaps as a 
consequence, corruption among civil servants occurs infrequently (Vallance, 1999). 
 
The Singapore Civil Service has a flexible wage system, comprising fixed and variable components in the 
monthly and annual salaries, which allows the government to respond appropriately to the economic 
and market conditions, and to link pay to performance. Civil service pay is an “all‐cash” wage – departing 
from the past practice of providing a variety of allowances, free housing, and free medical benefits – 
which enables civil servants to enjoy greater freedom and full flexibility using their salary. The civil 
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service conducts periodic salary reviews to maintain market competitiveness. It is also progressing from 
a seniority‐based system of fixed annual increment to a system where an individual’s annual increment 
quantum depending on his potential and performance assessment. Apart from the monthly salary, the 
civil service’s annual salary package also includes the following components: 
 
- A Performance Bonus that is a variable component paid annually, the amount of which depends on 
work performance; 
- A Merit Increment that is responsive to market conditions and differentiated by performance; 
- Special Bonuses (among which an Annual Variable Component) that are paid according to the 




Note that beyond day‐to‐day provision of services, performance‐based payment may also be 
targeted to reform managers, as illustrated below. 
 
Box 5: The Selective Accelerated Salary Enhancement (SASE) program in Tanzania 
 
The government of Tanzania has implemented an ambitious program of medium term pay reform 
strategy, comprising salary increases of about 8% per year for all civil servants; coupled with a short‐
term incentive scheme targeted on personnel with the greatest impact on service delivery and 
managers in charge of wider reform efforts, the Selective Accelerated Salary Enhancement (SASE). 
SASE was implemented in four departments which each developed own mechanisms for selecting 
eligible nominees on the basis of objective criteria. The latter signed performance agreements that 
serve as the basis for determining acceptable performance, and are appraised annually, using an 
objective assessment system. The difference in salaries between normal and SASE salaries were initially 
financed by a pool of donors. 
 
SASE encountered initial implementation difficulties and it was delayed; the program ran somewhat 
contrary to the socialist tradition and caused resentment among some categories of civil servants; the 
Government was also unable to conduct performance reviews and adhere to the envisaged annual 
salary adjustments. Nevertheless, despite these problems, SASE is considered as a success story as 
evaluations show that it had positive effects on beneficiaries’ performance, motivation and will to 
develop their own capacities (Kiragu, 2005; UNDP, 2006; Yambesi, 2006). 
 
 
Nevertheless, note that individual performance‐based incentives may not be appropriate when 
service providers work in teams (e.g. in the health sector), because it may be difficult to isolate 
the contribution of any single individual to team output, and because salary differences may 
impact negatively on team cooperation (for instance, if incentives are provided in a competitive 
way), especially in egalitarian societies prevailing in many low‐income countries. Therefore, 
service provision necessitating teamwork should rely on team‐ or agency‐level rather than 
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individual incentives.16 However, designing effective group incentives is difficult; it can work 
only if individuals feel adequately rewarded for their efforts and if the “free‐rider” problem – 
which occurs when one reduces her own effort while expecting the others will do their best to 
get the premium – is avoided. Limited evidence on financial group incentives in developed 
countries shows that much depends on the production process and the organization of the 
teams (Ratto et al., 2002). 
 
To sum up, what appears critical is to carefully design performance‐based incentive schemes 
and adapt them to the context, notably with respect to the existence (and cost) of reliable 
performance measures, the cost of alternative pay schemes (including supervision), the 
organization of work (tasks necessitating teamwork should be associated with agency‐level 
rather than individual incentives), as well as the prevailing culture as for work habits, the initial 
degree of non‐materialistic motivations,17 and the degree of egalitarianism of society. 
 
3.4 The issue of per diems 
 
A measure commonly used to bypass wage caps and other budget constraints preventing 
substantial increases in civil service pay is the resort to salary top‐ups, notably under the form 
of per diems. However, the practice has generalized over time and now brings about many 
perverse incentive effects such as diverting aid resources for patronage purpose (e.g. Smith, 
2003) or distorting efforts towards activities accompanied by per diems (workshops, etc.) at the 
expense of day‐to‐day service provision, thus weakening administrative capacity to provide 
services and lead reforms on a continuous and coherent basis. In some countries, it is now 
hardly possible to get civil servants do their job without giving them per diems. In addition to 
behavioral effects, the total amount of per diems and top‐ups may considerably weigh on 
projects’ and the government’s operational budget. 
 
A basic interpretation of incentive theory suggests that the “multi‐tasking” problem facing civil 
servants could be solved by paying them to do their supposed job (e.g. service provision or 
management) instead of paying them to do something else (e.g. attending superfluous 
seminars). In theory, this could be attained with zero budget impact by substituting correct 
incentives (be it wages, area allowance or performance premiums) for the estimated total 
amount of per diems. This rationale was at the heart of a health project in Senegal, as explained 
in the box below. 
                                                 
16 Yet, as teams and agencies are comprised of individuals, the motivational impact of agency‐level incentives must 
act upon individual incentives in some way (Paul and Robinson, 2007: 330‐331). 
17 When civil servants believe themselves to be the victims of serious pay injustice, attempts to introduce pay‐for‐
performance are likely to be misunderstood. For example, the pilot introduction by a donor of performance 
premiums for health workers in a Senegalese region ended up as being considered as a (legitimate) increase in 
salary, with absolutely no connection to any consideration for performance. It even spread over in other regions as 
a claim for a general increase in salaries (Diop and Paul, 2007). 
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Box 6: Substituting performance premiums for per diems 
 
A few years ago, a donor tested a project aimed at responding to the combined problems of high 
turnover and absenteeism of health staff in a poor region of Senegal, by providing them with 
performance premiums – while suppressing the use of per diems. Despite the fact that the principle was 
good, the project failed to reach its objectives for a series of reasons, notably because it was too narrow 
in scope (it concerned only one administrative region for a short period of time), was not owned by 
national constituencies, the evaluation system was too complicated and not accepted by workers used 
to egalitarian treatments. At the beginning of the project, the region attracted many workers because of 
higher revenues due to performance premiums; but staff continued to attend seminars in other regions 
so as to also get per diems. A few years later, they even turned away as they preferred the ancient 
system (Paul and Diop, 2007). This example illustrates that it is vain to introduce a micro‐system without 
taking account of the broad incentive environment. However, if introduced at national level with good 
ownership and better designed with due attention to the local culture, such a system could be an 
interesting way of providing civil servants with right incentives. 
 
 
4. Motivating Civil Servants through Non‐financial Incentives 
 
As explained, non‐materialistic sources of motivation may also be powerful to motivate workers 
– especially in the public sector. They may be mobilized through individual or organizational‐
level incentives. As for the latter, many contemporary approaches to managing for results 
subscribe to the view that a fundamental tool for improving agency performance is “the explicit 
specification of objectives, the measurement of performance against those objectives, and the 
setting of performance targets” (Paul and Robinson, 2007: 330). More generally, human 
resource management is a complex matter and resorts to a series of tools pertaining among 
others to the recruitment policy, promotions, career paths, training, control and evaluation, in 
addition to (present and delayed) remuneration. Strong financial incentives may sometimes not 
be recommendable at all: in some instances, generous salaries can generate perverse 
incentives without contributing to enhanced motivation and performance on a sustained basis 
(Robinson, 2006). Some human resource managers even argue that workers should be given a 
salary that is sufficient (to be considered as fair) – but above a certain level, motivation for 
performance should be induced by other types of incentives (Herzberg, 1968).18 As Kohn (1998) 
puts it, “Pay people well. Pay people fairly. And then do everything in your power to take 
people’s minds off of money.” 
 
                                                 
18 Herzberg (1968) believes that the factors involved in producing job satisfaction (and motivation) are separate 
and distinct from the factors that lead to job dissatisfaction. The author argues that motivator factors are intrinsic 
to the job (for example, achievement, recognition, the work itself, and responsibility), while dissatisfaction‐
avoidance (or hygiene) factors are extrinsic to the job (for example, supervision, interpersonal relationships, 
working conditions, and salary). 
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First note that materialistic motivation can also be mobilized by non‐financial incentives, in 
particular working conditions. Civil servants in many developing countries, especially those 
working in poor and remote areas, often complain that inadequate working equipment, work 
overload and difficult environment considerably undermine their motivation (e.g. Zinnen et al., 
2009; Samaké et al., 2009). A first way of mobilizing workers – which does not fall under wage 
caps – could thus be relaxing environmental de‐motivating factors. This is a factor that has also 
been identified to fight provider absence from the workplace, as shown below. 
 
Box 7: Fighting public provider absenteeism 
 
Provider absenteism is a high waste of resources and considerably hampers public service provision in 
many developing countries. Chaudhury et al. (2006) report the results of a study relying on 
unannounced visits to primary schools and health clinics in six countries. The study finds that a high 
proportion of teachers (about 19 percent average across the surveyed countries) and most of all health 
staff (35 percent) were absent the day of the visit. Data shows little evidence that pay strongly affects 
provider absence; by contrast, it shows evidence suggesting a role for the quality of infrastructure and 
working conditions (notably the availability of potable water) in influencing provider absenteeism. One 
of the strategies identified for tentatively reducing absence rests on improving the existing civil service 
system through a range of possible interventions such as upgrading facility infrastructure and 
constructing housing (which would involve extra budget outlays, but would not require politically 
difficult fundamental changes in systems), increasing the frequency and bite of inspections, or changing 
incentive structures (which may be more politically difficult to implement because of resistance on the 
part of workers). 
 
 
Mobilizing non‐materialistic motivations is probably particularly important in developing 
countries, where they may be weak from the start for instance due to bad working conditions 
and a devalorization of civil service following structural adjustment programs. Improving work 
norms, professional ethics, and public service motivation through human resource 
management initiatives appears to be essential. For instance, Rauch and Evans (2000) show 
that meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of bureaucratic 
performance in less‐developed countries. Other factors appear particularly adapted for 
enhancing intrinsic motivation – e.g. enriching tasks and improving working conditions – and for 
promoting ethical values and public service motivation – e.g., elaborating codes of conduct, 
fostering training and mentoring to ethics, reducing red tape, undertaking reform that clarifies 
goals and empowers employees, etc. (see Moynihan and Pandey, 2007; UNDP, 2007). The box 
below provides an interesting example of how civil servants’ non‐materialistic motivation may 
be mobilized. 
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The Filipino Civil Service Commission (CSC) runs an annual Honor Awards Program (HAP) that recognizes 
government officials and employees who have displayed outstanding work performance. The 
conferment of honor awards aims to motivate or inspire government employees to improve the quality 
of their performance and instill deeper involvement in public service. The HAP comprises two main 
categories of awards: 
- Awards for Outstanding Work Performance: two types of awards are conferred to individuals or 
groups of individual for exceptional or extraordinary contributions resulting from an idea or 
performance that directly benefited more than one department of the government or even had 
nationwide impact on public interest, security and patrimony; 
- An Award for Exemplary Conduct and Ethical Behavior that is conferred to individuals for consistent 
demonstration of exemplary ethical behavior on the basis of his/her observance of the eight norms 
of behavior stated in the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees” 
– that is, commitment to public interest, professionalism, justness and sincerity, political neutrality, 
responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, democracy, and simple living. 
 
Source: The Official Web Site of the Philippine Civil Service Commission: http://www.csc.gov.ph/cscweb/HAP.html  
 
 
Acting on social motivation by organizing peer reviews and practice exchanges is also very 
promising to increase motivation as well as performance, especially in traditional societies with 
strong social norms, as illustrated in the box below. 
 
Box 9: Motivating rural physicians for community health in Mali 
 
Mali encounters many difficulties in stabilizing and motivating qualified health staff to work in rural and 
poor regions. Fifteen years ago, several partners initiated a program aimed at creating and supporting a 
national association of rural physicians (Médecins de campagne) adhering to the principles of a Charter 
to provide quality health care at an affordable cost. A mechanism of quality improvement was 
established and the experience is very successful. Various incentives are provided to young physicians 
accepting to be posted in rural health centers, encompassing both financial and non‐financial motivators 
such as an installation kit, a solar panel, a motorbike, an initial training in rural medicine, and regular 
follow‐up. The belonging to an association and related practice exchanges, as well as social recognition 
by the community and public authorities have been identified as major factors for reducing professional 
isolation and motivating physicians. Regular seminars, trainings, research‐action and professional 
tutoring also enable improving the quality of care (Coulibaly et al., 2007). 
 
 
Note that among other factors, leadership is acknowledged as a crucial factor for mobilizing 
non‐materialistic motivations, driving change and innovation, fostering reform and sustaining 
capacity development (e.g. Lopes and Theisohn, 2003; Gilley et al., 2008, 2009).19 
                                                 
19 Gilley et al. (2009) show that motivating employees and providing effective communications are highly and 
significantly associated with effective implementation of change. Predictors of individual motivation, including job 
satisfaction, perceived equity, and organizational commitment, are primarily realized through the work 
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Another important aspect that may influence motivation and capacity development is 
supervision. Nevertheless, cognitive studies show that the perception of external interventions 
affects individual motivations: when workers perceive them as controlling of their behavior, this 
has a negative effect on intrinsic motivation – while interventions perceived as informational 
(for example, as an indicator of a worker’s competence) tend to increase intrinsic motivation 
(e.g. Deci, 1971). Supervision should therefore be as much as possible designed as an 
informative intervention, as illustrated below. 
 
Box 10: Supportive supervision of health workers 
 
The World Health Report 2006 (WHO, 2006) reckons that supportive yet firm – and fair – supervision, 
especially coupled with audit and feedback to staff, is one of the most effective instruments available to 
improve the competence and performance of many types of health workers. However, it states that 
“When it does take place, the nature of the supervision is important. If supervisory visits become sterile 
administrative events, or are seen as fault‐finding and punitive, they have little positive effect and may 
have negative effects. In contrast, supervision that is supportive, educational and consistent and helps 
to solve specific problems, can improve performance, job satisfaction and motivation” (WHO, 2006: 75). 
 
 
Finally, a coherent incentive system must complement “positive” motivators with a credible 
and fair risk of sanction in case of misbehavior. However, civil services in some developing 
countries crucially lack an adequate system of sanctions and the “culture of non‐punishment” 
which is prevalent is due to various factors such as the absence of a functional and independent 
judicial system, the low work norms in place, the close‐knit nature of society which precludes 
harming other members of one’s social network – together with the risk of reciprocal 
punishment in case the worker you punish today becomes your boss the day after. Therefore, 
sanction threats may become meaningless in practice. In this environment, increasing 
transparency and resorting on civic scrutiny (“voice”) may be crucial for improving incentives 
for public officials, supporting reform and increasing accountability, motivation and 




Motivating civil servants for performance, capacity development and reform is far from being a 
straightforward issue and no blueprint solution can be advised, all the more since developing 
country contexts are varied, complex and sometimes very different from those of Western 
countries, on which the bulk of literature has been written. Incentive schemes should be 
designed on a case‐by‐case manner after careful assessment of the initial situation, and should 
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often be implemented on an incremental basis with short‐term solutions targeted on some 
categories of staff. This paper explored a range of incentives that may be combined, according 
to local constraints and specificities, to form a coherent incentive system. Such a system should 
comprise both carrots and sticks (positive motivators and sanctions) and mobilize all types of 
motivations – materialistic or not (Paul and Robinson, 2007). Moreover, while motivation lies 
within individuals, incentives may pertain to all three levels of capacity – that is, individuals, 
organizations, and the enabling environment (UNDP, 2006, 2009). This paper has provided 
multiple examples of how factors pertaining to these three levels may impact upon civil 
servants’ motivation. 
 
Individual incentives are often low‐powered in the public sector, mainly because of the 
difficulty to find appropriate objective performance measures to which linking remuneration, as 
well as risks of distortions and importance of teamwork. However, pay may be linked to 
performance to some extent in some sectors, provided appropriate measures are taken to 
mitigate potential risks (e.g. quality checks). Non‐financial incentives may also be much needed 
in many developing country contexts, especially regarding the improvement of working 
conditions (so as to foster intrinsic motivation), peer pressure, practice exchange (which is also 
a crucial element for capacity development) and the development of work ethics. These may be 
combined in order to ensure workers globally feel fairly treated and are thus dedicated to their 
job. When public services are produced by teams of workers, incentives should preferably be 
designed at agency level in order to ensure collaboration. 
 
When a comprehensive pay and incentive reform is not possible in the short run, special 
incentive schemes may be targeted to some categories of individuals (e.g. those accepting to be 
posted in remote and poor areas, or reform managers) or organizations (e.g. special premiums 
for priority sectors, or de‐linking agencies from the civil service). However, this should be 
considered with caution, especially in egalitarian societies, and a balance should be reached 
between increased incentives, social acceptance and financial sustainability. Temporary 
measures (such as SASE in Tanzania) may be a good way to foster reforms while ensuring a 
progressive adaptation of the whole civil service. Facility‐level performance incentives (e.g. 
special trainings for staff or additional material granted to performing facilities) may also be 
preferable to individual financial incentives when teamwork is important. 
 
The global environment is obviously the level at which it is most difficult to act; yet, it often 
imposes constraints on lower‐level incentives, and may foster or hamper reforms. Specificities 
of low‐income countries (such as lack of performance data and supervision capacities, wage bill 
caps, culture of non‐punishment and acceptance of corruption) add further constraints on 
possible incentive schemes. The global environment should therefore be carefully assessed 
when introducing a change in the incentive system in order to identify main constraints and 
potential leverages. Finally, it should be kept in mind that reducing disincentives that favor non‐
 
 
25 | G l o b a l  E v e n t  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  
conducive behavior can often be more useful than introducing new incentives; and that 
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